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Capital regulation represents the core of prudential regulation
in banking. Despite the aim of the regulators to have a safer and
more robust banking industry, the eﬀects of capital regulation
on banks’ capital and risk decisions appear ambiguous. The paper
analyses the relationship between capital and risk changes and
the impact of regulatory pressure for a sample of European banks
during the period 2006–2010, which encompasses the start of the
latest ﬁnancial crisis. Results highlight that banks tend to adopt
a diﬀerent behaviour depending on the capital ratio considered,
supporting the so-called ‘gamble for resurrection’ hypothesis. Ev-
idence supports the rethinking of the regulatory framework, espe-
cially with reference to higher and stricter capital requirements.
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introduction
Capital regulation aims at ensuring that banks hold a level of capi-
tal consistent with their risk exposure, and their decisions on cap-
ital change as their risk position is modiﬁed by endogenous or ex-
ogenous factors. Nevertheless, if not correctly designed, capital re-
quirements might produce unwanted eﬀects because of moral haz-
ard and asymmetry of information which lead banks to excessive
risk taking (Kahane 1977; Koehn and Santomero 1980; Kim and San-
tomero 1988; Gennotte and Pyle 1991). Understanding the link be-
tween regulation and banks’ decision is of utmost importance be-
cause it might help policy makers to adjust capital regulations. This
issue is particularly relevant in the European area where countries
are subject to common general regulation which nevertheless is ap-
plied on country basis through national supervisory authorities, po-
tentially generating an uneven playing ﬁeld. Understanding howEu-
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ropean banks react to capital regulation, is a key point in the frame-
work of the banking and market union.
The latest crisis stimulated further discussion and brought to the
revision of the prudential framework, as well as the introduction of
additional measures to control bank risk taking that led to a new set
of rules under the name of Basel i i i.
This study tries to answer to the following question: what was
the role of regulatory framework in determining changes in capital
ratios and in risk exposure during the crisis? In order to answer this
research question, balance sheet data for a sample of 1,442 European
banks from 2006 to 2010 are analysed.This study contributes to the
existing literature providing updated evidence on the behaviour of
European banks in light of the implementation of the third version
of the Basel Accord, which although strengthening and modifying
the Basel i i framework, relies on the same assumptions on banks
behaviour. The paper is organised as follows: section 2 reviews the
main empirical contributions on the topic and presents the model;
section 3 describes the sample; the fourth section discusses the re-
sults; the last section draws the conclusions.
capital and risk decisions
The literature on bank capital is extensive and the eﬀects of capi-
tal requirements have been studied thoroughly. Theories argue that
capital regulation can lead to excessive risk taking if capital require-
ments are not correctly designed (Kahane 1977; Koehn and San-
tomero 1980; Kim and Santomero 1988; Gennotte and Pyle 1991)
and empirical studies have investigated banks’ behaviour to provide
evidence on the eﬀects of regulation, but results remain ambiguous.
Changes in capital and risk are modelled in this study using a si-
multaneous equation framework (Shrieves and Dahl 1992; Jacques
and Nigro 1997). According to this setting, banks have a desired (op-
timal) level of capital and risk, which cannot be observed. Changes
in capital and risk are assumed to represent adjustments toward
these optimal levels that depend on exogenous factors such as reg-
ulation, economic cycle and other variables, e.g. size, level of liquid
assets and proﬁtability.
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In general, capital and risk changes appear to be severely aﬀected
by the banks’ ex-ante capital level. A number of studies ﬁnd that low
capitalised banks tend to increase risk when facing a drop in capital
ratio, taking the ‘gamble for resurrection’ and increasing the prob-
ability of default (Calem and Rob 1999; Godlewski 2005; Iwatsubo
2005; Camara, Lepetit, and Tarazi 2013).
Results become even more varied when considering the quality
of capital: banks’ decisions vary according to the capital ratio con-
sidered, i.e. total regulatory capital, Tier 1 capital, or equity (Kleﬀ
and Weber 2003; Hussain and Hassan 2005; Memmel and Raupach
2010; Camara, Lepetit, and Tarazi 2013).
Hence, this analysis focuses on three formulations of capital
(cap) to enable a possible comparison of results. Firstly, cap is
interpreted as the total regulatory capital ratio (trcr). This ratio is
obtained by the level of capital to risk weighted assets and has a
direct relationship with regulatory provisions. Secondly, Tier 1 reg-
ulatory capital ratio (t1cr) is included in the analysis as additional
measure for the highest quality part of regulatory capital. Lastly,
equity to total assets (eta) is considered. This ratio does not con-
sider risk weighting and might provide diﬀerent indications. Equity
to total assets is a common indicator used by markets to evaluate
the capitalisation of ﬁrms and does not respond to regulatory pro-
visions. Moreover, it is easy to compute, it has coherence between
numerator and denominator, as both are computed using the same
rules and has a relationship with leverage.
Risk is measured as the ratio of risk weighted assets to total as-
sets (rwa/ta), in line with the notion of risk formulated by pru-
dential regulation.
Banks decisions are inﬂuenced by regulation. In fact, they have
to comply with aminimum capital ratio, but they can decide on how
much capital to hold above the minimum. Banks with a high cap-
ital ratio are considered to be less subject to regulatory pressure,
as they hold a buﬀer suﬃcient to absorb eventual shocks. On the
contrary, banks with a low capital ratio will be subject to more reg-
ulatory pressure: on the one hand their capital ratios are likely to
be more stressed during downturns and on the other, in case reg-
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ulation becomes stricter, they would have to strengthen the capital
base or limit their exposure to risk, in order to reach the new regula-
tory minimum. In general, when banks face an increased regulatory
pressure, they tend to adjust their capital ratio by increasing capital
and decreasing risk, in line with the regulatory objective (Shrieves
and Dahl 1992; Jacques and Nigro 1997; Matejašák, Teplý, and Čer-
nohorský 2009) although contrasting evidence is provided by Heid,
Porath, and Stolz (2003) and Van Roy (2005). In this study we deﬁne
regulatory pressure as in Alexandre and Bouaiss (2009): reg1 rep-
resents the diﬀerence between the bank’s capital ratio and the min-
imum capital ratio, which is 8, and reg2 is deﬁned as the product
of reg1 and the level of the capital ratio at the beginning of the pe-
riod (capt−1) and expresses the speed at which banks adjust their
capital.
Banks’ characteristics are also likely to aﬀect banks’ decisions.
Bank size can have a positive or a negative contribution. A positive
relationship with bank capital may exist because larger banks tend
to be also more complex and this exacerbates the asymmetry of in-
formation (Gropp and Heider 2010). On the other hand, size can
have a negative impact on capital buﬀers. Larger banks have an eas-
ier access to capitalmarkets (Ahmad, Ariﬀ, and Skylly 2009) andmay
have greater ﬂexibility in funding themselves to increase their cap-
ital ratios, using for instance hybrid instruments or subordinated
debt (Heid, Porath, and Stolz 2003). However, the sign and impact
of size is likely to depend on the specialisation: for instance savings
and cooperative banks facemore restrictions in raising capital (Kleﬀ
andWeber 2003). The negative sign might also be related to the ‘too
big to fail’ issue: larger banks may hold less capital because they rely
on public intervention in case of distress.
When controlling the impact of size on risk, a positive or a nega-
tive sign is expected. In the latter case, a diversiﬁcation eﬀect would
prevail (Lindquist 2004; Van Roy 2005), however, literature ﬁnds
controversial results.
Liquidity (liq) is able to inﬂuence both, capital and risk deci-
sions (Allen and Gale 2004; Jokipii and Milne 2011; Athanasoglou
2011), but the expected sign is ambiguous. Liquidity (liq) is deﬁned
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as liquid assets to customers and short term funding (Athanasoglou
2011). Proﬁtability can impact capital decisions as proﬁtable banks
may in fact increase their capital through retained earnings (Kwan
and Eisenbeis 1997; Rime 2001; Van Roy 2005;Matejašák, Teplý, and
Černohorský 2009). roa is included in the model, as in previous
studies, to account for the proﬁtability of the bank, as well as the
ratio of net interest income to total asset (nii/ta).
As underlined by Altunbas et al. (2007), eﬃciency is a relevant
factor when analysing the relationship between decisions on capital
and risk. The cost to income ratio is here considered a simple indi-
cator for eﬃciency (eff).
Finally, the rate of gdp growth (gdp) is included in order to
check for speciﬁc country features, which can aﬀect capital and risk
decisions by banks (Lindquist 2004; Van Roy 2005). Capital require-
ments as stated in Basel i and Basel i i have a procyclical behaviour.
In fact, when the economic cycle deteriorates, losses increases and
the level of capital needed to satisfy capital requirements increases
as well. However, it can be diﬃcult for banks to raise capital during
economic downturns, as it becomes even scarcer and more costly.
Banks could therefore be forced to decrease risky assets, e.g. reduc-
ing the amount of loans destined to the real economy. The opposite
can happen during economic booms.
The relationship between changes in capital and in risk in this
study is represented by the following equations:
Δcapj,t = a0+a1sizej,t+a2liqj,t+a3roaj,t
+a4effj,t+a5gdpj,t−1+a6capj,t−1
+a7riskj,t+a8reg2j,t+ej,t (1)
Δriskj,t = b0+b1sizej,t+b2liqj,t+b3effj,t
+b4gdpj,t−1+b5riskj,t−1+b6capj,t
+b7reg1j,t+b8reg2j,t+sj,t (2)
Themodel shows endogeneity problems, because changes in cap-
ital and risk are interrelated and they show up on both equations,
as also conﬁrmed by the Hausman test. To deal with endogeneity,
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the study applies a gmm approach. Lagged values of capital and risk
are used as instruments for changes in capital and risk, as suggested
and implemented by previous literature. Additionally, an Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond estimation is employed to check the robust-
ness of the results. The estimator is speciﬁcally designed for panel
with a low number of time-series observations and a high number
of groups and is particularly suitable in case of persistent data (Arel-
lano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998).
sample description
The sample is constituted by European commercial, savings and
cooperative banks. Balance sheet information is obtained from
Bankscope for the period from 2006 to 2010.This time span enables
to have homogeneity in the data, as all the banks apply the same
accounting rules starting in 2006, and helps to focus on banks’ de-
cisions during the ﬁnancial crisis. Besides, ending in 2010, it ex-
cludes the most dramatic times of the European sovereign debt
crisis, which might have further modiﬁed banks behaviour. Addi-
tionally, focusing on this period helps excluding the amendments
made after the European Banking Authority (eba) recommenda-
tions to raise Core Tier 1 capital to 9 in 2011, as well as the choices
made under the supervisory monitoring of the leverage ratio and
the observation period of the liquidity ratios, which started in 2011
(European Banking Authority 2011).
Banks with assets and total regulatory capital ratio values avail-
able for less than four consecutive years and banks with a capital
ratio higher than 100 are eliminated from the sample.
The resulting sample is made of 1,442 banks: 513 are commercial
banks, 683 are cooperative banks and the remaining 246 are savings
banks (table 1). More than half of the banks in the sample are from
Western European countries (1,102). To bemore speciﬁc, almost 37
of the banks in the sample are Italian banks, but their weight on
the sample in terms of total assets (as at 2010) is limited (8.91) if
compared for instance to French banks. There are few of the latter
(1.46 of the banks in the sample), but represent more than 25
of total assets. The same holds for banks from the United Kingdom
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table 1 Description of the Sample by Country
() () () () () () ()
 Albania ee  . ,, .
 Andorra we  . ,, .
 Austria we  . ,, .
 Belarus ee  . ,, .
 Belgium we  . ,,, .
 Bosnia-Herzegovina ee  . ,, .
 Bulgaria ee  . ,, .
 Croatia ee  . ,, .
 Cyprus we  . ,, .
 Czech Republic ee  . ,, .
 Denmark we  . ,, .
 Estonia ee  . , .
 Finland we  . ,, .
 France we  . ,,, .
 Germany we  . ,,, .
 Greece we  . ,, .
 Hungary ee  . ,, .
 Ireland we  . ,, .
 Italy we  . ,,, .
 Latvia ee  . ,, .
 Lithuania ee  . ,, .
 Luxembourg we  . ,, .
 Macedonia (fyrom) ee  . ,, .
 Malta we  . ,, .
 Moldova we  . , .
 Montenegro ee  . , .
 Netherlands we  . ,,, .
 Norway ee  . ,, .
 Poland ee  . ,, .
 Portugal ee  . ,, .
 Romania ee  . ,, .
 Russian Federation ee  . ,, .
 Serbia ee  . ,, .
 Slovakia ee  . ,, .
Continued on the next page
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table 1 Continued from the previous page
() () () () () () ()
 Slovenia ee  . ,, .
 Spain we  . ,,, .
 Sweden we  . ,, .
 Switzerland we  . ,,, .
 Turkey we  . ,, .
 Ukraine ee  . ,, .
 United Kingdom we  . ,,, .
Total , . ,,, .
ee  .
we , .
notes Column headings are as follows: () number, () country, () East-
ern/Western Europe, () number, () percentage, () total assets as of December
, () percentage. Elaboration from Bankscope.
that weight for more than 15 in terms of assets. German banks are
numerous and their total assets represent 11.25, but also in this
case, there are few large banks and many small banks.
Summary descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in ta-
ble 2.The average value of total assets over the time period analysed
is around 26 billion Euros. The average total regulatory capital ra-
tio (a.trcr) over the period 2006–2010 is around 16.19, well above
the minimum required by the regulation. The median for trcr is
slightly lower than themean (table 2).Most of the banks in the sam-
ple therefore seem to be well capitalised in terms of total regulatory
capital ratio (table 3). The average Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio is
14.45 for the whole sample.
Table 4 summarises the evolution of the capital ratios in the time
period considered, using three diﬀerent variables: total regulatory
capital ratio (trcr), Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio (t1cr) and equity
to total assets (eta).
results
gmm provides results summarised in table 5. Looking at the capital
equations, capital and risk showa statistical signiﬁcant relationship,
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table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Total Assets , ,* ,* , ,,*
tcr , . . . .
trcr , . . . .
eta , . . –. .
Capta , . . . .
roaa , . . –. .
nii/av.ta , . . –. .
Cost/Income , . . . .
notes *× . Figures in thousand Euros for Total assets and in percentage
for the other variables. Elaboration from Bankscope.
table 3 Distribution of
Banks According
to the Average
trcr
Average trcr No. of banks
< 8 
≤ a.trcr< . 
.≤ a.trcr<  
a.trcr≥  
notes Elaboration from
Bankscope.
table 4 Evolution of Capital Ratios
Year trcr tcr eta
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
notes trcr – total regulatory capital ratio;
tcr – Tier  capital ratio; eta – equity to to-
tal assets. Figures in percentage. Elaboration
from Bankscope.
even if the level of the coeﬃcient is low: the relationship with trcr
is positive, while it has a negative signiﬁcant impact on changes in
eta and t1cr. This might suggest that banks in the sample tend
to increase their overall capital ratio (trcr) when risk increases, but
they have the opposite behaviour if they have to adjust their capi-
tal level in terms of eta and t1cr, which express the highest quality
components of capital.Thenet increase could be therefore the result
of an increase in the lowest quality instruments, such as Tier 2 and
Tier 3, which are not destined to absorb losses in a going concern
basis, but only in a gone concern framework, as clariﬁed by the lat-
est regulatory instructions.The behaviour of banks seems to reﬂect
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table 5 gmm for Capital Equations
Variable dcap = dtrcr dcap = deta dcap = dtcr
. . . . . .
const .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .***
size –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.***
liq .*** .*** . . . .
roa . . .*** .*** .*** .***
gdp –.*** –.*** –.* –.* –.*** –.***
eff –.** –.** –.*** –.*** –.** –.**
reg .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .***
capt−1 –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.***
drisk .*** .*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.***
ad –.*** –.*** –.***
und –.*** –. –.***
R2 . . . . . .
Obs.      
notes ***, **, * respectively indicate statistical signiﬁcance at ,  and 
level. R2 is calculated as the square of the correlation between the observed and
the predicted, the latter calculated on the sample. J-Stat is not applicable in this
case as the equations are exactly identiﬁed.
the possibility to choose between various instruments included in
the capital base to increase their capital ratio. Moreover, since capi-
tal ratios depend both on the capital level and on risk weighted as-
sets, banks have a possibility tomodify their regulatory capital ratio
through changes in the numerator or in the denominator and the
choice between the two might depend on economic convenience.
The value of capital in t−1 shows a negative signiﬁcant relation-
ship with changes in t. Banks with high capital ratios tend to de-
crease their capital ratio in the next period. The impact is stronger
for the regulatory capital ratio (trcr).This could indicate that banks
try to increase risk while maintaining the same level of capital in or-
der to optimise the use and the cost of the latter. However, if the pe-
culiarity of the time period is taken into consideration, this relation-
ship could be the result of an increased riskiness of assets and a de-
crease in the capital base. These eﬀects might produce a decrease in
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the capital ratio in the next period (as the numerator diminishes and
the denominator increases). Moreover, as already discussed, banks
must comply with theminimum of 8 capital ratio, therefore banks
close to the minimum might have less space to decrease capital ra-
tios if compared with banks that have a very high capital ratio.
Regulatory pressure modelled as reg2 has a positive and signif-
icant impact on all the speciﬁcations. reg2 represents the speed
of adjustment of capital ratios. It is not surprising that the eﬀect is
higher for regulatory capital ratios, as these are the variables consid-
ered by the supervisory authorities. It is reasonable to believe that
reg2 will be lower for banks far from the minimum and higher for
banks approaching the minimum.
Size has a negative coeﬃcient for all the deﬁnitions of capital ra-
tio and it is always statistically diﬀerent from zero. The results sup-
port the theories maintaining that larger banks tend to hold lower
capital ratios, as they can more easily raise capital in the market.
This negative relationship could also be attributed to the moral haz-
ard deriving from the ‘too big to fail’ status, as larger banks might
hold a lower level of capital, relying on the eventual bail out by the
government in case of bankrupt. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients
varies depending on the type of capital ratio considered. The value
of the coeﬃcient is in fact larger for regulatory capital ratios (trcr
and t1cr) while it is in general smaller for changes equity to total
assets (eta). Overall, results are in line with previous research.
Liquidity shows a positive sign: more liquid banks tend to in-
crease their capital base. The contribution of the variable appears
statistically signiﬁcant but small, with a coeﬃcient that is around
1 when considering changes in trcr; it is even smaller in size and
not signiﬁcantwhen considering the other capital ratios.The limited
size and signiﬁcance of the contribution of liquidity could depend
on the period analysed. In fact, during the crisis, ﬁnancial interme-
diaries tended to retain their liquidity because of the uncertain evo-
lution of events and doubts on the solvency of other institutions.
Return on assets (roa) generally has a positive impact on chan-
ges in capital. The coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant when capital
is measured as t1cr and as eta. The literature suggests that this
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positive relationship derives from the possibility to use earnings to
strengthen the capital base (Berger 1995). Apparently, also banks in
the sample tend to increase their capital thanks to retained earn-
ings.
Eﬃciency computed as cost to income ratio has in general a weak
negative sign when changes in capital ratios are considered. More
eﬃcient banks, therefore seem to operate with a lower capital ra-
tio and this supports the theory that regulators might allow more
eﬃcient banks to operate with less restrictions on their leverage.
gdp growth has a negative impact on changes in capital ratios. The
eﬀect is stronger for trcr and t1cr. Banks located in countries
with slower growth tend to increase their capital ratios more, ev-
erything else equal. The negative relationship could be inﬂuenced
by the request to strengthen the capital base made both by markets
and regulators, after the bust of crisis. The coeﬃcient appears small
and therefore the economic situation of countries seems to con-
tribute, but with a limited strength, as it is reasonable to assume
that banks that operate internationally do not take into account
only their home country economy but also the ones of the vari-
ous countries where they operate. Moreover, since the investigation
does not include the whole business cycle, it has to be interpreted
with care.
In speciﬁcation 2, the threemodels include two additional dummy
variables describing the level of capital. ad is equal to one for banks
which are adequately capitalised, while und is a dummy variable to
isolate undercapitalised banks.1
The dummy variable for well capitalised banks (well) is not in-
cluded in the model, as these banks are taken as a basis for the anal-
ysis. The relationship with changes in trcr and in t1cr is negative
and signiﬁcant. Adequately capitalised and undercapitalised banks
with high risk levels tend to decrease their regulatory capital more
than well capitalised banks. While this could be a surprising result,
it might be related to the risk equation and to the ‘gamble for resur-
rection’ hypothesis. The period analysed (2006–2010) encompasses
the last ﬁnancial crisis: undercapitalised banks might have suﬀered
losses due to the ﬁnancial downturn and this could have been trans-
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table 6 gmm for Risk Equations
Variable trcr trcr eta eta tcr tcr
const .*** .*** .*** .* .*** .***
size –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.***
liq –.** –.* –. –. –.* –.*
gdp .*** .*** .** .*** .*** .***
eff –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.***
reg –.*** –.*** .** .*** –.*** –.***
reg .*** .*** .*** –.*** .*** .***
riskt−1 .* .* .*** . . .
dtrcr . .
deta –.*** –.***
dtcr . .***
ad –. .*** –.
und –.** . –.
R2 . . . . . .
Obs.      
notes drisk = d(rwa/ta). ***, **, * respectively indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
,  and  level. R2 is calculated as the square of the correlation between
the observed and the predicted, the latter calculated on the sample. J-Stat is not
applicable in this case as the equations are exactly identiﬁed.
lated into a further decrease of the capital base, both in terms of
regulatory capital and in terms of equity to total assets ratio. Addi-
tionally, most of the banks suﬀered an increase in the riskiness of
their asset portfolio.
As a robustness check, the variable for the proﬁtability (roa) is
substitutedwith net interest income to total assets (nii/ta). Coeﬃ-
cients generally keep the same sign, size and statistical signiﬁcance
in all the speciﬁcations of the model.2
Risk equations are now considered (table 6). Overall, results
highlight a weak relationship between explanatory variables and
changes in risk related to total assets.3
Changes in risk are negatively inﬂuenced by size, consistently
with the diversiﬁcation hypothesis. Larger banks can diversify their
assets better and therefore they can pursue a decrease in the overall
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level of risk. Liquidity has a weak negative eﬀect on risk decisions.
The same type of relationship holds for eﬃciency.
gdp growth has a positive and signiﬁcant sign: banks located in
countries with a high gdp growth tend to take on a higher level of
risk. During booms, banks seem to have a less prudent behaviour to
exploit proﬁt opportunities.
Regulatory pressure measured as reg1 has a negative and sig-
niﬁcant coeﬃcient for the two regulatory capital ratios (trcr and
t1cr). If a bank has a high level of reg1 (meaning that the dif-
ference between its trcr and the regulatory minimum is positive),
everything else equal, it will tend to pursue a decrease in risk. On
the contrary, banks with a low reg1, which are undercapitalised
or adequately capitalised, will pursue an increase in risk. This again
supports the ‘gamble for resurrection’ hypothesis. reg2 express the
speed of adjustment. The sign is generally positive across capital ra-
tio deﬁnition. However, the impact is really small and its contribu-
tion to decisions on risk seems to be negligible.
The impact of changes in capital ratio on decisions on risk seems
statistically signiﬁcant only when considering capital as eta and
as t1cr, but controlling also for the ex ante level of capital. In the
ﬁrst case the relationship is negative, while in the second it is pos-
itive. Therefore, for changes in eta and risk, a two way negative
relationship seems to hold. The same cannot be said for the other
capital ratios.
As robustness check, given the structure of the data and of the
model, an Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond model is also tested. Esti-
mations provide overall similar results (table 7). With reference to
the capital equations, signs and statistical signiﬁcance appear simi-
lar to what obtainedwith gmm, but for a size, which takes a positive
signiﬁcant sign in several speciﬁcations. Considering the relation-
ships between capital and risk, changes in risk now positively aﬀect
changes in capital also for eta and t1cr. Besides, only for eta, past
levels of capital ratios (etat−1) take a positive sign.
Turning to risk equations, the only relevant diﬀerences appear to
be the change in sign of past levels of risk, although not signiﬁcant,
and of liquidity coeﬃcient (table 8). The latter takes a diﬀerent sign
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table 7 Results for Capital Equations with Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond
Regressions
Variable dcap = dtrcr dcap = deta dcap = dtcr
a. a. b. b. c. c.
const .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .***
size .*** .*** –.*** –.** –. .*
liq .* .* . . .** .
roa . . .*** .*** .*** .***
gdp –.*** –.*** –.* –. –.*** –.***
eff –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.***
reg .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .***
capt−1 –.*** –.*** .*** .*** –.*** –.***
drisk .*** .*** . . .* .**
ad –.*** .** –.***
und . –.*** .
R2 . . . . . .
Obs.      
notes ***, **, * respectively indicate statistical signiﬁcance at ,  and 
level. R2 is calculated as the square of the correlation between the observed and
the predicted, the latter calculated on the sample.
with signiﬁcant, but very low coeﬃcient for changes in t1cr. Finally,
und for undercapitalised banks takes a positive instead of a nega-
tive sign in all the speciﬁcations, suggesting that risk increasesmore
in undercapitalised banks than in other banks.
conclusions
This study investigates the decisions on capital and risk for a wide
sample of European banks from 2006 to 2010, focussing on the im-
pact of regulatory pressure. The topic has been deeply analysed by
previous literature, however results are still controversial.
The main results suggest that banks tend to have a diﬀerent be-
haviour depending on the type of capital ratio analysed. A positive
relationship between total regulatory capital ratio and risk seems
to exist, but the relationship becomes negative when controlling for
changes in Tier 1 capital ratio or equity to total assets, which can be
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table 8 Results for risk equations with Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond
regressions
Variable trcr trcr eta eta tcr tcr
const .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .***
size –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.***
liq . –. . –. .*** .
gdp .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .***
eff –.*** –.*** –. –. –.** –.**
reg –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.***
reg .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .***
riskt−1 –. –. –. –. –. –.
dtrcr .*** .***
deta .*** .***
dtcr .*** .***
ad –.*** –.*** –.***
und .** .*** .***
R2 . . . . . .
Obs.      
notes drisk = d(rwa/ta). ***, **, * respectively indicate statistical signiﬁcance
at ,  and  level. R2 is calculated as the square of the correlation between
the observed and the predicted, the latter calculated on the sample.
considered the ratios capturing the highest quality capital. Regula-
tory pressure has a relevant impact on banks’ decisions, but it does
not seem to have the desired eﬀect on low capitalised banks.The aim
of the regulation is to induce banks to take risks consistently with
their capital base (and vice versa, having a capital base suﬃcient to
compensate for their risk exposure), but low capitalised banks tend
to have the opposite behaviour, increasing riskwhen their capital ra-
tio decreases, approaching the minimum.The results therefore sup-
port the so-called ‘gamble for resurrection’ hypothesis, i.e. banks
close to the minimum standards tend to increase their risk expo-
sure in order to beneﬁt from possible proﬁts that in the end could
be used to strengthen their capital base. It would be useful to deter-
mine a mechanism that enables the supervisor to intervene quickly
and promptly in case of a drop in the capital ratio, in order to avoid
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that banks with a low level of capital increase their risk in a way that
could threaten the stability of the institution and of the whole ﬁ-
nancial system.
Overall, results support the existence of perverse incentives in
banks’ behaviour and the inability for the regulation to discipline
banks’ risk taking eﬀectively. More transparency and a more homo-
geneous deﬁnition of capital as in Basel i i i can be an eﬀective tool
in controlling banks’ capital and risk taking behaviour. The ﬁndings
of this research have relevant policy implication with respect to the
European supervisory and regulatory system. The European bank-
ing sector is facing the challenges of the ﬁnancial crisis that espe-
cially hit the Euro-Mediterranean countries, which are traditionally
more bank-centred and are also severely living the sovereign debt
crisis. Given the regulatory revision that requires stricter regulation,
it is important to understand the eﬀects of capital requirement on
banks’ decisions, as the latter can inﬂuence their lending behaviour
and, as a consequence, the availability of funds to families and ﬁrms,
hence aﬀecting the economic growth of the area. Constant and fur-
ther research is needed to deeper investigate the behaviour of banks.
notes
1 A bank is considered well capitalised if its average trcr is larger or equal
to 10.5; adequately capitalised if average trcr is equal or larger than 8;
undercapitalised if the average trcr is below the 8 regulatory threshold.
2 Results are omitted.
3 The value of R2 for risk is very small. The results should therefore be in-
terpreted with care. It has to be acknowledge, in fact, that R2 is not the
most suitable measure for the goodness of ﬁt in this case, but it has been
indicated as other statistics are not applicable. J-stat, for example, can not
be calculated because the system of equations is exactly identiﬁed.
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